Conceptual Engineering
We're not fighting about the thing — we're fighting about the word.
The question
You've been in this argument so many times you could run it from memory. Someone says a thing isn't really X — isn't really violence, isn't really a disease, isn't really racism, isn't really art — and someone else says it absolutely is, and you both reach for examples, and the examples don't help, because for every one you bring they have a reason it doesn't count. And at some point — late, usually, when everyone's tired — you realise you haven't been disagreeing about the thing at all. You've been disagreeing about the word. About where to draw its edge. About what it's for.
And the first time you saw that, it felt like a breakthrough — like you'd finally got underneath the noise to the real question. Of course. We're not arguing about whether she's a woman; we're arguing about what "woman" should pick out. We're not arguing about whether it's a disease; we're arguing about what we want "disease" to do. The fight got clearer the second you stopped pretending it was about facts.
And then, just as fast, it curdled. Because if the fight is about what the word should mean — then isn't the person redefining it just… cheating? Moving the goalposts? Changing the dictionary mid-argument so they win? You've watched people do exactly that, in bad faith, and call it progress. And you've done it yourself, in good faith, and called it clarity. And you genuinely cannot tell, from the inside, which one you were doing. You don't even know if "you can just decide what a word means" is a power you have, or a thing you only pretend to have while the language goes on meaning whatever it was always going to mean, with or without your permission.
What you practise
Win the definition and you win the argument. Most of us half believe that, and we reach for it when a fight will not settle on the facts. Here you learn to pull that habit in two. One question is what a word should mean, and for whose purposes; that one you can argue, and there are real standards for arguing it well. The other is whether you can make it mean that, out in the mouths of millions who never heard your case. Nothing is settled for you here. You leave able to argue for a better meaning without mistaking the proposal for the change.
The episodes
Each episode builds on the one before, and the finale hands the question back to you sharper, not settled.
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01
The move you've been making
Some arguments no quantity of facts will close — whether it was really violence, really a disease, really racism — because the fight is about the word, not the thing. This first episode names the move, and separates two questions usually run together: what should the word mean, and can you change what it means?
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02
'You can't just redefine words' — and why that's a cartoon
"You can't just redefine words" is tested against the record: the whale stopped being a fish, "marriage" moved, and no one was cheated. The flat rule fails — but a sharper version of the objection is left standing for later.
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03
Designing a better word: explication and the ameliorative turn
The ameliorative method, in the line of Carnap and Sally Haslanger: stop asking what a word means and ask what concept we should have, given the work the word has to do. The episode builds the engineer's toolkit and hands it its first serious objection, from P. F. Strawson — is this fixing the concept, or changing the subject?
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04
The word only you are using
A well-designed concept that nobody adopts changes nothing. This episode separates designing a meaning from implementing one, drawing on Tyler Burge's account of how meaning lives in a community, and ends with an exercise: write down what it would actually take for your word to win.
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05
Can you even steer a meaning?
Herman Cappelen's challenge, from Fixing Language: what a word means is fixed by factors outside anyone's control — the history of use, millions of speakers, the world itself, in the externalist tradition of Kripke and Putnam. Deciding what a word should mean was never the same as changing what it does.
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06
But meanings DO move
And yet meanings do move — "gay," "marriage," and "planet," which a room of astronomers redefined in 2006. The episode holds both truths together and finds the real question underneath: not whether meaning can change, but which changes can be made on purpose, and by whom.
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07
Whose word is it?
If meanings move through collective uptake, implementing a concept is politics — whose purposes count, whose use sticks, against whose resistance. Kwasi Wiredu's question is put alongside: whether the very tools of the engineering are someone else's to begin with. The worst version — engineering as a polite name for winning — is held without rescue.
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08
The words you most want to fix
The final episode runs every question in the series on one word, "violence," and gives the honest reply — you can propose what a word should mean and argue for it well, but you cannot, by deciding, make it mean that. What the argument was ever about is handed back unresolved, as it was always going to be.
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Thinkers
The thinkers and traditions this series draws on:
Related series
Your turn
The paper you work for has argued about one word for a year: famine. Which crisis abroad earns it. Now the editor has ruled, and gone further. From next month the paper will use "famine" of this country too, of towns where children come to school having eaten nothing since Friday. The old word, she says, let a real hunger hide. At the editorial meeting a reporter stands up. His grandparents lived through a famine that emptied their village. Calling this famine, he says, borrows the weight of what happened to them.
- Is the editor saying what "famine" means, or what it should mean? If the second, is the old word failing at a job you can name, or does the paper want a heavier word?
- The paper can rule its own pages. Has that changed what "famine" means to readers, or to aid agencies? If not, what would, and who would have to do it?
- Is the new line naming a hidden harm, or changing the subject while keeping the old word's force? Whose purpose is it for, and who was not in the room?
A good answer keeps two things apart — what the word should mean, and whether the paper can make it mean that — says whose purpose the ruling serves, and meets the reporter on the weight he says his grandparents' word carries instead of ruling him out of order.
Sources
Written by AI under human direction. This is the reading the series was built from. checked against source means the passage was found in the cited work and a second, independent model checked the episode's use of it; supports in part means that check judged the use a little stronger than the passage alone establishes; passage located means a reader found the passage but it has not had the second check. Unmarked entries are background reading.
- International Astronomical Union — IAU 2006 General Assembly: Result of the IAU Resolution votes (press release iau0603) (2006) The astronomers' own announcement of the 2006 vote in Prague that defined "planet" and left Pluto out. It is the plainest record of a word being changed on purpose, by a named body, on a known day. supports in part
- P. F. Strawson — Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy (1963) Strawson's reply to Carnap: building a sharper replacement for a vague word does not solve the old puzzle, it only changes the subject. The series keeps this worry open from the second episode to the last. The link is a scan of the essay. supports in part
- Ludwig Wittgenstein — Philosophical Investigations (1953) Wittgenstein's late book argues that a word's meaning is its use, and that the things a word covers can be linked like family members, with no single shared feature. The link is the Stanford Encyclopedia's overview of his philosophy, not the book. supports in part
- Explication An encyclopedia article on Carnap's method of replacing a vague concept with a precise one, and on the long argument over whether doing so just changes the subject. It is a summary, not a primary text.
- Plato — Euthyphro (c. 399 BCE) The short dialogue in which Socrates presses "what is piety?" and turns down every example as an answer. It is the clearest early case of the demand for one true definition that the series traces back. Free online translation. supports in part
- Anil Gupta and Stephen Mackereth — Definitions (2023) An encyclopedia overview of what a definition is, including the difference between defining a thing's real nature and fixing what a word means. It is a summary, not a primary text.
- Rudolf Carnap — Logical Foundations of Probability (1950) Carnap's first chapter sets out 'explication': swapping a vague everyday idea for a precise one designed to do a job better. This is the method the series treats as the forerunner of redesigning words on purpose. The link is a free scanned copy. supports in part
- Hannes Leitgeb and André Carus — Rudolf Carnap — Supplement D: Methodology (2026) An encyclopedia supplement explaining Carnap's method of replacing a vague idea with a precise one, and the objection Strawson raised against it. It is a summary, not Carnap's own text.
- Georg Brun — Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering (2016) Carnap's idea that a vague word can be swapped for a sharper one built for a job — Episode 3's source for that idea, then tested against the worry you've only changed the subject. Link is the author's own draft.
- Mark Pinder — On Strawson's critique of explication as a method in philosophy (2020) Pinder looks again at Strawson's charge that swapping a vague word for a cleaner one does not solve the old problem but only starts a new conversation under the old label, and asks whether the charge holds. The series leaves that question open.
- Sally Haslanger — Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be? (2000) The paper that asks not only what race and gender are but what we want those words to do, and proposes definitions built for the fight against injustice. The link is the JSTOR record; the article may need library access. supports in part
- Sally Haslanger — Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (2012) Haslanger's collected essays on how social categories are made and how to redesign the words for them to serve justice. The link is the publisher's catalogue page. supports in part
- Sally Haslanger — What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds (2005) Haslanger sets out her method here: don't ask what a word truly means, ask what it should mean, given the job it needs to do. A later episode turns that same question back on the philosopher — asking who gets to decide which purposes count. supports in part
- David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell — Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms (2013) The paper that names 'metalinguistic negotiation': arguments that look like disputes about facts but are really about how a word should be used, fought out by each side using it their own way. The link is a free copy of the published paper. supports in part
- David Plunkett and Tim Sundell — Metalinguistic Negotiation and Speaker Error (2021) A later paper by the same pair explaining how people argue over the use of a word by using it, and what happens when a speaker gets a word wrong. The link is the authors' copy.
- Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett — Conceptual Ethics I (2013) The article that names 'conceptual ethics': the study of which words and concepts we ought to use, not just what they mean. The link is the publisher's page; the article may need library access. supports in part
- Herman Cappelen — Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (2018) Cappelen's book on redesigning words on purpose. He argues a word's meaning lives outside any one person, fixed by forces too tangled to map and largely beyond our control — the question this series tests against real words. The link is the publisher's catalogue page. checked against source
- Jon Cogburn — Review of Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (2019) A review of Cappelen's book that sets out its claims that meaning change is hard to understand and largely out of our hands, while the book still defends the practice. It is a summary, not the book.
- Hilary Putnam — The Meaning of 'Meaning' (1975) Putnam imagines a twin planet where 'water' is a different substance. Two identical people say the same word with the same thoughts, but mean different things — so meaning is not only in your head. Links to a free copy of the paper. supports in part
- Saul A. Kripke — Naming and Necessity (1980) Kripke's lectures argue that a name reaches its object through a chain of speakers passing it on, back to a first act of naming, not through a description in the speaker's head. The link is the publisher's catalogue page. checked against source
- Esa Díaz-León — Descriptive vs. Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations (2020) Díaz-León argues moral and political reasons should guide what a word like "gender" means — both already, and going forward. This chapter doesn't address whether meaning can be changed on purpose; the link is the publisher's page, not the full chapter.
- Joey Pollock — Content internalism and conceptual engineering (2021) Pollock argues that if meaning is partly in our heads, as some theories hold, then we have more control over it than Cappelen allows. The link is the journal's page for the article, not the full text.
- Steffen Koch — The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering (2021) Koch argues meaning can change when a whole community acts together over time, even though no one person controls it alone. Episode six uses this argument, under Esa Díaz-León's name, to answer Cappelen: he only ruled out deciding alone. The link is the journal's page. supports in part
- Steffen Koch, Guido Löhr, and Mark Pinder — Recent work in the theory of conceptual engineering (2023) A survey of recent theories of deliberately changing concepts, including the debate over whether and how a proposed change can actually take hold. The link is the journal's page. supports in part
- Camila Domonoske — Sheila Michaels, Who Helped Bring Honorific 'Ms.' To The Masses, Dies At 78 (2017) A news obituary of the campaigner who spent years pushing "Ms." into use, with the history of how the title spread without any official body behind it. It is a news report, not a scholarly history. supports in part
- Kwasi Wiredu — Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (1996) Wiredu's essays on which ideas are shared by all peoples and which belong to one language and history, written from his work between English and Akan. The link is the publisher's catalogue page.
- Sanya Osha — Kwasi Wiredu (1931—2022) An encyclopedia overview of Wiredu's project of sorting borrowed concepts from universal ones, with his examples from the Akan language. It is a summary, not Wiredu's own writing.
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (US Department of Homeland Security) — Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce (2020) One government agency's list, issued in March 2020, of which workers counted as 'essential' during the pandemic. It shows the kind of official list the episode describes; other countries issued their own. supports in part
- Theodore Sider — Writing the Book of the World (2011) Sider argues that some ways of dividing up the world match its real structure better than others, so a better concept can be a truer one, not just a more useful one. The link is the publisher's catalogue page.
Where to start
- Sally Haslanger — Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be? (2000) This is the paper the series keeps coming back to: Haslanger asks what 'woman' and 'race' should mean given what we need the words for, and she says openly that she is recommending, not reporting. Read it to see the idea put at full strength, then ask the series' question of it: whose purposes, and could she ever make the words change?
- Amie L. Thomasson — Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering (2023) A short, free essay in plain English, written for general readers. It explains what it means to ask what a word like 'person' or 'freedom' should mean, why that changes how people get treated, and how a new meaning might actually spread through a society. It covers the whole map of the series in about fifteen minutes.
- David J. Chalmers — What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should It Be? (2025) This began as a talk and still reads like one. Chalmers splits the job into designing a concept, getting people to use it, and judging how it works. He says plainly that the second part is the hard one: changing what an old word means is 'extremely difficult', because its meaning is not in any one person's control. That is the catch the series ends on, explained by someone who still thinks the work is worth doing.