Climate & Future Generations
I'm sacrificing for people who don't exist yet and can't be harmed.
The question
You turned the thermostat down again. You took the train, the slow way, because the flight felt like something you'd have to answer for. You vote the way you vote partly for them — the ones who come after, the ones who'll inherit the mess. And you've never once let yourself finish the thought that sits underneath all of it: that you have no idea who they are. Not "you haven't met them." You can't meet them. They aren't late; they're not born. And here's the part that wakes you up. Picture the world if we change course — if we sacrifice, the way everyone says we should. Now picture the world if we don't. Two different futures. And not just two different worlds — two completely different sets of people. Different countries get built, different couples meet, different children get conceived on different nights. The grandchildren of the sacrificing world and the grandchildren of the burning world are not the same people who got a better or a worse deal. They're strangers to each other. Neither set exists yet. And whichever future we make, the people in it owe their entire existence — every breath — to our having made that one and not the other. So when you say you're doing it for them: for whom? The ones in the good future only get to be born because you chose it. You can't have wronged them by choosing the bad one. There'd just have been different people there, blaming you for nothing, because they'd never have existed to blame you at all.
What you practise
You already ask what we owe the people who come after us. Here the question changes shape. Most of us answer: we would be harming them. That reason fails. Big choices change who gets born, so people in a ruined future are not worse off than they would have been. Without the ruin they would not exist. You learn not to stop there. "Nobody is wronged" does not mean "nothing is bad". You also learn to find the moral choice hidden inside a number that looks like arithmetic. Nothing here hands you a verdict. You leave able to name the ground you stand on, and say what it cannot settle.
The episodes
Each episode builds on the one before, and the finale hands the question back to you sharper, not settled.
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01
The strangers you're sacrificing for
The small adjustments made with the future in mind — the thermostat, the slower train, part of a vote — are all made for people who do not yet exist. The first episode holds that unfinished thought still and asks who exactly is being sacrificed for, leaving the conviction standing but no longer secure.
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02
Only wrong if it's worse for someone
The most basic idea in morality — that a wrong requires someone it wrongs, a person made worse off than they would otherwise have been — is built into the strongest form the conviction about the future has taken. A real victim, a real harm, and a scale for the duty, all resting on one requirement that the next episode tests.
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03
Different choices, different people
Derek Parfit's non-identity problem, run at the scale of the climate. Change course or not, and different people are born of different choices — so no particular person in the wrecked future can say your choices made their life worse than it would otherwise have been. The reason relied on for two weeks returns no verdict, and the episode does not soften the result.
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04
A worse world, full stop
The convenient conclusion — no victim, so nothing owed — is examined rather than accepted, and against it stands the impersonal view that a worse world is simply worse, whoever lives in it. That view survives non-identity because it never needed a victim, and then meets Parfit's repugnant conclusion — an arithmetic no one can fault, leading to a vast world of barely bearable lives that no one can accept.
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05
Standing across time
A ground the size of a single person, between the lone victim and the cosmic sum — fair terms of the kind Rawls proposed, an agreement made without knowing which century you would be born into, and the plain thought that future people hold rights against us. Both give the duty a form; neither supplies the person, since the unborn cannot sign and a claim needs a holder.
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06
The ethics hiding in a number
The economists' offer — a discount rate that prices a harm a hundred years from now in today's figures, disputed between Stern and Nordhaus. The episode argues that the number is a moral choice presented as arithmetic; the ethics did not vanish into the calculation, it is hiding inside one figure that governs policy.
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07
Acting in the dark
Suppose the duty were settled — acting on it still requires knowing a future no one can know. The episode takes up decision under genuine uncertainty, where the calculation stalls for want of odds and the sober rule of guarding against the worst case points to an irreversible disaster down both roads without saying which to fear.
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08
Responsibility runs downhill
Hans Jonas's answer, deliberately held back — responsibility runs downhill, from our power to the future's helplessness, as a parent's duty runs to a child who never asked to exist. It rests on no victim, no sum, no contract and no claim; what it cannot say is how much fear on the future's behalf is enough.
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09
Owed to whom?
The final episode sets the five grounds side by side — harm, the worse world, fair terms, rights, and responsibility running downhill — none refuted, none able to settle the question, while the reluctance to wreck the world stands undiminished. No verdict is offered; the question of what is owed, and to whom, is handed back at its full weight.
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Thinkers
The thinkers and traditions this series draws on:
Related series
- Looks back to 19 · Should I Have Kids?
- Looks back to 01 · What You Owe a Stranger (Singer)
- Looks back to 08 · Choice & Blame (Free Will)
- Looks back to 10 · Do You Deserve What You Have?
- Sets up 24 · Should You Want to Live Forever?
- Sets up 25 · Hope, Despair & the Future
- Sets up 27 · Meaning Without God
- Sets up 28 · Knowledge & Power
Your turn
Your town has been offered a deal. The country needs somewhere to bury its spent nuclear fuel, and the rock under your valley is ideal. In return the town gets a new hospital, a school, and cheap power for fifty years. The waste stays dangerous for about a hundred thousand years. The engineers say a leak is very unlikely, but nobody can promise what rock and water will do over that long. The vote is next month.
- Say the waste leaks and poisons a village in the year 20,000. Would those villagers have been born if your town had voted no? If not, who has been wronged? Is the leak still bad?
- The government's figures count a death in the year 20,000 as almost nothing. Is that a fact about the future, or a choice about it? Whose choice?
- Nobody can put odds on what happens down there. Does that tell you to vote no, or only that you don't know? A no costs the hospital. Who pays for that?
A good answer names what the town owes the people who will live above the waste, if anything, and says on what ground — a ground that survives the fact that those villagers would owe their existence to the vote. It has to say where that ground runs out, and still get you to a vote.
Sources
Written by AI under human direction. This is the reading the series was built from. checked against source means the passage was found in the cited work and a second, independent model checked the episode's use of it; supports in part means that check judged the use a little stronger than the passage alone establishes; passage located means a reader found the passage but it has not had the second check. Unmarked entries are background reading.
- Stephen M. Gardiner — A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (2011) Gardiner argues that climate change tempts people now to tell themselves comforting stories that let them off the hook. Episode 1's case against the slogans draws on that idea. The link is the publisher's page, not the book.
- Stephen M. Gardiner — A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption (2006) The article where Gardiner first set out the idea that climate change invites self-serving excuses that shift the cost onto later generations. The link is a catalogue record, not the text.
- Wikipedia contributors — Person-affecting view A short encyclopedia overview of the view that an act can only be wrong if it is worse for someone. It is a summary, not a work by any of the philosophers who hold the view. supports in part
- Derek Parfit — Reasons and Persons (1984) The book in which Parfit set out the non-identity problem, with its Depletion case, and the Repugnant Conclusion. The series' central argument follows Part Four closely. The link is the publisher's record, not the text. supports in part
- M. A. Roberts — The Nonidentity Problem (2026) A free, careful encyclopedia survey of the non-identity problem, including Parfit's Depletion case and the main attempts to solve it. It is a summary about the problem, not Parfit's own text.
- Richard Yetter Chappell, Darius Meissner, William MacAskill — Population Ethics (2023) A clear textbook chapter on how to value populations: the total view, the Repugnant Conclusion, the average view and threshold views, and the troubles each one meets. It is a summary written for students. checked against source
- Gustaf Arrhenius — An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies (2000) The paper in which Arrhenius named the Sadistic Conclusion, the result that some ways of valuing populations prefer adding lives of suffering to adding lives that are good but not good enough. The link is the journal's record. checked against source
- Derek Parfit — Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion? (2016) Parfit's own late paper on the Repugnant Conclusion, cited in Episode 4. The episode says he found no way out; this paper argues the opposite, proposing one. The link is to the journal record, not the full text.
- John Rawls — A Theory of Justice (1971) Rawls's main work, where he sets out the veil of ignorance, the just savings principle between generations and the conditions under which justice applies. The link is the publisher's page, not the text. supports in part
- Leif Wenar — John Rawls (2025) An encyclopedia overview of Rawls's thought, including the original position and the principle of just savings. It is a summary, not Rawls's own writing.
- Lukas Meyer — Intergenerational Justice (2026) An encyclopedia survey of what present people owe future ones as a matter of justice, covering Rawls's savings principle, its special assumption about caring for descendants, and the rights of future people. It is a summary of the debate. checked against source
- Thomas Scanlon — What We Owe to Each Other (1998) Scanlon's statement of contractualism: an act is wrong if it could not be justified to each person affected on terms they could not reasonably reject. The link is the publisher's page. supports in part
- Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan — Contractualism (2018) An encyclopedia overview of Scanlon's contractualism and the main objections to it. It is a summary, not Scanlon's book.
- David Hume — A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Hume's account of where justice comes from: scarce goods and limited generosity among people who need one another. Rawls took his 'circumstances of justice' from it. The link is the full text, free. supports in part
- Elizabeth Finneron-Burns — Contractualism and the Non-Identity Problem (2016) A journal article asking whether Scanlon's contractualism can explain what we owe future people, once the non-identity problem removes the person who would object. The link goes to a catalogue record, not the article itself.
- D. Valeska Martin — Navigating Nonidentity: Scanlonian Contractualism and Types of Persons (2024) A recent open-access article arguing that the usual repair for Scanlon's view, reasoning about types of future people rather than particular ones, does not solve the non-identity problem. It supports the episode's point that the question is still open.
- Martha C. Nussbaum — Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006) Nussbaum's book on the people that social-contract theories leave out, where she sets out her list of ten central capabilities owed to everyone up to a threshold of dignity. The link is the publisher's page.
- Martha C. Nussbaum — Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach — Chapter 2, 'The Central Capabilities' (2011) The chapter in which Nussbaum lists her ten central capabilities and explains the threshold of a life with dignity. The link is a copy of that single chapter. checked against source
- Krushil Watene — Nussbaum's Capability Approach and Future Generations (2013) An article arguing that Nussbaum sets aside the question of future generations and that doing so costs her theory something. It shows that extending her list to people not yet born takes further work. The link is the journal page.
- Johan Brännmark — Future generations as rightholders (2016) An academic article suggesting future generations could hold rights as a group, not as individuals — one way round the puzzle of naming who exactly holds the claim. The episode tests this and weighs what it costs. Link: the journal page, not the full text.
- Ori J. Herstein — The Identity and (Legal) Rights of Future Generations (2009) A legal philosopher's treatment of whether future people can have rights given that our choices decide who they will be. The link is a research-sharing page for the paper.
- Nicholas Stern — The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (2007) The report on the economics of climate change that Stern wrote for the British government. It set the pure discount on future wellbeing close to zero, allowing only for the chance that humanity ends. The link is the publisher's record of the book edition. supports in part
- William D. Nordhaus — Facts (Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2018) (2018) The official Nobel Prize record for Nordhaus's 2018 award, given 'for integrating climate change into long-run macroeconomic analysis'. It confirms the date and the reason for the prize, not his view on discounting. supports in part
- Frank Ackerman — Debating Climate Economics: The Stern Review vs. Its Critics (2007) A plain-language guide to the argument between Stern and his critics over how much a future life should count against a life today. It lays out the formula behind the discount rate and shows where each side's number came from. supports in part
- John Broome — Climate Change and Population Ethics (2022) Broome's chapter on how climate change bears on the number of people who will ever live. In it he argues that discounting later wellbeing for its own sake cannot be defended. The link is the author's own copy of the chapter. supports in part
- Simon Caney — Climate Justice (2021) An encyclopedia survey of justice and climate change, with sections on discounting the future and on acting under risk and uncertainty. It is a summary of the debate.
- Martin L. Weitzman — On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change (2009) The paper in which Weitzman argues that when the worst climate outcomes are too likely to ignore and bad without limit, ordinary cost-benefit analysis breaks down. He called the result the 'dismal theorem'. The link is a free copy held by Harvard's repository. checked against source
- Frank H. Knight — Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) The book that made the distinction between risk, where the odds are known, and uncertainty, where they are not. The seventh episode is built on that distinction. The link is the full text, free. checked against source
- Jeroen Hopster — Climate Uncertainty, Real Possibilities and the Precautionary Principle (2023) An article on when a feared climate outcome is a real enough possibility to call for precaution, and on the gap between risk and uncertainty that the precautionary principle leaves unclear. The link is the journal page.
- Gary W. Yohe, Richard S. J. Tol — Precaution and a Dismal Theorem: Implications for Climate Policy and Climate Research (2009) A 2009 book chapter on what the dismal theorem means for climate policy. It warns against pushing the case for caution too far: taken to its limit, caution would demand action against every remote danger, with no way to say which comes first.
- Hans Jonas — The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (1984) Jonas argues that our new power over the planet's future creates a duty that runs the other way: from the powerful to the helpless, on the model of a parent and a newborn. The link is the publisher's page for the book, not the text. supports in part
- Responsibility to Others in the Future: The Foundation of the Imperative of Responsibility in Hans Jonas (2021) An online essay on how Jonas grounds our responsibility to people who do not yet exist, with the newborn's plain demand to be cared for as its model. It is a commentary, not Jonas's own book.
Where to start
- Stephen M. Gardiner — A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption (2006) A short, clearly argued essay you can read free in an afternoon. It explains why the obvious case for acting on climate keeps failing to turn into action: each generation can pass the cost on to the next, and the comforting stories we tell ourselves are part of how that happens.
- M. A. Roberts — The Nonidentity Problem (2026) A free, carefully written overview of the puzzle at the centre of the series: our choices about the future decide who will even be born, so it is hard to say we harm them. Read the first two sections, which start from a whole community using up its resources, then skim the list of proposed answers.
- John Broome — Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (2012) A short book written for general readers by the philosopher Episode 6 quotes on discounting. It works through, in plain terms, what we owe people who will live after us, how much we should pay now, and what to make of the fact that our choices change who will exist.